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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
SALES-MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY AND THE
NECESSITY FOR PRIVITY OF CONTRACT-
ILLINOIS HISTORY
Ex contractu-ex delicto ... These were the two divisions of the law
as it came down from the ancient writ system in England. A peculiar
combination of these two divisions in the field of manufacturers' liability
arose out of the dictum in the 19th century English case of Winterbottom
v. Wright.' The dictum in that case, that in an action of negligence in the
field of manufacturers' liability, there must be a showing of privity of
contract in order for the plaintiff to recover, was quickly adopted by the
American courts as the "general rule."
In addition to liability for negligence,2 the manufacturer may be liable in
an action for breach of express" and/or implied warranty.4 Often, any
number of these grounds of manufacturers' liability have been pleaded in
a single suit. Generally the warranty actions have retained their character
as an action ex contractu, so that privity is required.
Because privity is so important in the field of manufacturers' liability, a
large part of the subsequent discussion is devoted to that topic. However,
consideration is also given to the other relevant areas in this field, such as
the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the acceptance
theory and caveat emptor.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURERS'
LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS
In the early history of Illinois, the simple economic structure involved
almost exclusively direct sales by the manufacturer to the ultimate con-
sumer. It was in this setting, where the Illinois courts followed the rule of
caveat emptor,5 that the law of manufacturers' liability grew. However,
when the manufacturer sold directly to the consumer, a warranty implied
in law that the goods were of fair, average quality became part of the
contract of sale.0 Today this warranty is termed a warranty of merchanta-
bility.7 If the buyer relied on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer,
1 10 Mees & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2 Chapman v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 333 111. App. 529,77 N.E. 2d 883 (1948).
a Lindroth v. Walgreen, 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E. 2d 595 (1946); but see Lindroth
v. Walgreen, 338 111. App. 364, 87 N.E. 2d 307 (1949), affd, 407 fl1. 121, 94 N.E. 2d 847
(1950).
4 Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 111. App. 305, 47 N.E. 2d 739 (1943).
5 Archdale v. Moore, 19 M11. 565 (1858).
6 Misner v. Granger, 9 Ill. 69 (4 Gilm.) (1847).
7 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , S 15(1) (1961); Appleman v. Fabert Motors Inc., 30 111.
App. 2d 424, 174 N.E. 2d 892 (1961).
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then the law implied a warranty that the goods were reasonably fit for the
use for which they were intended.8 This warranty is termed, today, a
warranty of fitness for purpose.9 In the second half of the 19th century
the Illinois courts recognized that under certain circumstances these war-
ranties extended to persons other than the purchaser, under the third
party beneficiary theory. 10 However, one of the earliest Illinois cases that
attached liability to a manufacturer solely for negligence was Brady v.
Empire Machinery Co.," in which the question of privity with third per-
sons was expressly avoided. 2 The first important Illinois case adopting the
theory of Winterbottom v. Wright was Field v. French,13 in which plain-
tiff, a customer of Marshall Field & Co., sued the elevator contractor when
the elevator in which he was riding collapsed. Plaintiff was denied recov-
ery because
[there was] no fact alleged showing privity between appellee and the Elevator
Company without which there can be no liability in this case to appellee for
alleged negligent construction of the elevator. The duty of the Elevator Com-
pany was to Field, not to the appellee, so far as concerns negligent construc-
tion.14
The privity requirement thus stated has continuously been upheld by the
Illinois courts. 15 However, to temper the harshness of the "general rule"
requiring privity, many exceptions have been adopted by the courts.
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS EXCEPTION
The first exception is the inherently dangerous product exception as
formulated in Thomas v. Winchester,16 an early New York case. While
the privity requirement was adopted because it would be unjust to make
the manufacturer owe a duty to the public at large, it was held not to be
8 Hallock v. Cutler, 71 111. App. 471 (1897); Kohl v. Lindley, 39 Ill. 195 (1866);
Archdale v. Moore, 19 Ill. 565 (1858); Beers v. Williams, 16 Ill. 69 (1854).
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211, § 15(1) (1961); Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill.
2d 28, 139 N.E. 2d 275 (1956).
10 Dallum v. Birdsall, 66 Ill. 378 (1872) (third party beneficiary physically present
when warranties made); Union Hide & Leather Co. v. Ressig, 48 II. 75 (1868) (con-
tract made for the benefit of defendant, therefore the seller's warranties extended to
him).
1160 Ill. App. 379 (1896).
12 10 Mees & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
'3 80 II. App. 78 (1899). 14 Id. at 88.
15 Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E. 2d 231 (1956); Nat'l. Iron
& Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Murray,
119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902).
166 N.Y. 397 (1852). Defendant held liable for mislabeling a jar of poison to a
person with whom he was not in privity because the product involved a risk of harmi
to users no matter how much care was used in its preparation.
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unjust to hold a manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product to such
a duty.17 In Illinois, "inherently dangerous" has been defined as "danger-
ous in its normal or nondefective state, as for example, explosives and
poisons."' 8 Thus, lubricating oil, 19 tractors 2 0 and a glass door,2 ' were held
not to be inherently dangerous. While, on the other hand, a shoe dye con-
taining substances poisonous to certain allergic individuals was held to be
inherently dangerous, because it involved a risk of harm to a portion of
the population, no matter how much care was used in its manufacture. 22
Further, the manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product owes a
non-delegable duty to the public. In Hulk v. International Mfg. Co.,2 3 the
manufacturer of a space heater was held liable for the plaintiff's injuries,
even though the negligence causing the injuries was that of a distributor
and not the manufacturer. Because the manufacturer was negligent in fail-
ing to inspect the space heater, constructive knowledge of its defects was
imputed to him. And marketing of a product with constructive knowl-
edge of its defects constitutes fraud by the manufacturer even though the
product is sold through a distributor selected and trained by him. The
hiring of a distributor to sell the product is not such an intervening cause
as will relieve the manufacturer of liability for his negligence because the
duty owed third persons is non-delegable.
IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS EXCEPTION
Closely allied with the inherently dangerous product exception to the
privity rule is the imminently dangerous product exception. These excep-
tions differ in that an inherently dangerous product involves a risk of
harm to persons and property in its natural, common nondefective state;
on the other hand, an imminently dangerous product involves such a risk
of harm only if improperly made, constructed, or repaired. The rule is
stated in the Restatement of Torts, Section 395, as follows:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an un-
reasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it
1 7 Reddick v. General Chemical Co., 124 Ill. App. 31 (1905).
18 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., Inc., 20 I11. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E. 2d
333 (1959).
19 Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902).
20 Kuhn v. Goedde, 26 111. App. 2d 123, 167 N.E. 2d 805 (1960).
21 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co.,, Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E. 2d
333 (1959).
22 Steber v. Kohn, 149 F. 2d 4 (7th Cir. 1945).
23 14 111. App. 2d 5, 142 N.E. 2d 7i7 (1957); but see Black v. Texas Co., 247 111. App.
301 (1928).
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for a purpose for which it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier
should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose
for which it is manufactured.2 4
This Restatement rule, which is the law in Illinois today was gradually
developed by a large body of case law. The early cases recognizing the
imminently dangerous exception to the privity requirement allowed re-
covery on a theory somewhat akin to fraud. For example, in Standard Oil
Co. v. Parrish,25 the manufacturer was liable for the explosion of adul-
terated illuminating oil on the theory that "one must not knowingly send
out an instrumentality which is imminently dangerous without notice of
its nature and qualities. '26 The most important early case, which laid the
foundation for the present-day rule in Illinois, is Davidson v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co.2 7 Here plaintiff recovered for injuries sustained from the
explosion of a defective grinding wheel supplied by the defendant which
held itself out as a manufacturer. The court, although recognizing the rule
requiring privity, laid down three exceptions to that rule, in the following
language:
1) Where the act of negligence of a manufacturer or a vendor is with refer-
ence with some article imminently dangerous to the life or health of human-kind ....
2) Where an owner's act of negligence causes an injury to one invited upon
the owner's premises ... [This deals with invitees, trespassers, etc., and is
not in the scope of this article.]
3) Where one, without giving notice of its qualities, sells or delivers an article
which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life and limb, in which case
he becomes liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom, which
might have been reasonably anticipated, regardless of any contractual rela-
tions between the parties...28
The court further held that while the third exception was applicable to
the instant case, the grinding wheel was not "imminently dangerous in it-
self [inherently dangerous]," but due to its defective condition, it was
"imminently perilous [imminently dangerous]."
Until the Davidson case, the courts used the privity requirement as the
basis for not extending the liability of a negligent manufacturer to per-
sons other than immediate parties.29 Even after the courts extended liabil-
24 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1934).
25 145 Fed. 829 (7th Cir. 1906).
26 Id. at 830; accord, Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902).
27 171 I1. App. 355 (1912). These three exceptions were stated without change in
substance in two recent Illinois cases: Dittmar v. Ahem, 37 Ill. App. 2d 167, 185 N.E.
2d 264 (1962); Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 111. App. 133, 100 N.E. 2d 405 (1951).
28 ld. at 364.
29 Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902).
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ity to the user of an imminently dangerous product,30 they still refused to
extend liability to the public at large. Thus, in Shepard v. Kensington
Steel Co.,81 when a wheel came off a truck and hit plaintiff, a pedestrian,
recovery was denied as against the negligent dealer. However, the rule
advocated in the dissenting opinion that the seller of an imminently dan-
gerous article owes a duty to the public at large later became the law in
Illinois. Today, a manufacturer or other seller of an article, not inher-
ently dangerous, but which may become so when put to its intended use,
owes the public a duty of care, skill and diligence in its manufacture. 32
The rationale the courts used in ultimately extending the liability of the
negligent manufacturer to parties not in privity was grounded in the tort
doctrine of foreseeability. In the early case of Standard Oil Co. v. Par-
risb,33 the defendant, a manufacturer of illuminating oil, was deemed to
have "contemplated" that its product would be used in the households of
purchasers; so that the negligent manufacturer was liable to purchaser's
daughter. And in Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co.,34 the liability was ex-
tended to include all those whom the manufacturer could foresee would
use it "properly for the purpose for which it is supplied. ' 35 The evolution
of the imminently dangerous rule has ultimately made the negligent man-
ufacturer liable to the public at large.36 This liability is based upon the
premise that "limiting recovery to those in contractual privity with the
manufacturer becomes inadequate and unjust under our specialized eco-
nomic system where many middlemen intervene between the producer
and the ultimate consumer." 37
30 Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 111. App. 355 (1912).
31262 Ill. App. 117 (1931).
32 Morgan v. Mixon Motor Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 323, 137 N.E. 2d 504 (1956); see
Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E. 2d 405 (1951); Kreger v. Diener,
321 Ill. App. 302, 53 N.E. 2d 26 (1944); accord, Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 111. App.
2d 494, 135 N.E. 2d 271 (1956) (recognizing rule but denying recovery to assembler
of finished product).
33 145 Fed. 829 (7th Cir. 1906). 34 333 11l. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928).
35 Id. at 81, 164 N.E. at 164; accord, Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 Ill. App.
2d 47, 180 N.E. 2d 46 (1962) (employee of purchaser); Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co.,
290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E. 2d 714 (1937) (tenant injured by negligently constructed bed
purchased from defendant by landlord); Roche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 111. 507, 193
N.E. 529 (1934) (recognizing foreseeability as basis for liability).
36 Moran v. Mixon Motor Co., 10 111. App. 2d 323, 137 N.E. 2d 504 (1956). Plaintiff
recovered for injuries sustained when his auto collided with an auto negligently re-
paired by defendant. Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 145, 100 NE. 2d 405, 411
(1956) ("manufacturer ... liable for bodily harm ... to those whom he should expect
to use the chattel or to be in the vicinity of probable use"); Wintersteen v. Nat'l.
Cooperage Co., 361 111. 95, 197 N.E. 578 (1935).
37 Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 140, 100 N.E. 2d 405, 409 (1951) (liability
for negligenit manufacture cxtendcd to second-hand purchaser).
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The liberalness of the rules regarding the imminently dangerous ex-
ception, nevertheless, has its limitations. For example, the manufacturer is
not held liable for an extraordinary use of his product which he could not
foresee. 8 Moreover, it has also been held that not every defect in a prod-
uct renders it imminently dangrous; rather, "[t]he test is,-how dangerous
is this product with the particular defect, if any, it is alleged and proven
to have in a particular case,-is the product as defectively made ... inher-
ently dangerous when put to its intended use? ' '19 Another way the manu-
facturer can limit his liability is to warn of the defect. 40 It has also been
recognized that it is not necessary for the manufacturer to adopt every
new design or safety device, and to use a device which is reasonably safe
and in customary use in the industry is not negligence.41 Further, the Illi-
nois Appellate Court has held that one who manufactures an essential part
of an imminently dangerous product does not incur the same liability as
the manufacturer of the finished product.42
The law in Illinois, with respect to the imminently dangerous rule, is as
applicable to suits involving property damage as it is to those involving
personal injury.43 Thus, by gradual case development, the Illinois courts
have adopted in principle the law as stated in the Restatement of Torts44
by holding that the manufacturer or supplier of a defective chattel which
involves an unreasonable risk of causing substantial harm to persons or
property, is liable to all persons who can foreseeably be damaged by the
chattel in its ordinary use.
FRAUD
"Another exception has also been said to be where the manufacturer's
negligence consists of a fraudulent or deceitful statement or misrepresen-
38 Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 I11. App. 340 (1928); Healy v. Heidel, 210 Ill.
App. 387 (1918). No liability for breaking of window sash when used in extraordinary
manner in washing windows.
39 Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 111. App. 2d 494, 504, 135 N.E. 2d 231, 236 (1956).
40 Trust Co. v. Lewis Auto Sales, Inc., 306 IIl. App. 132, 28 N.E. 2d 300 (1940).
Automobile dealer who warned purchaser of defect in brakes held not liable. For the
application of the rule to a negligent manufacturer who did not warn of defects, see
Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E. 2d 46 (1962); Calhoun
v. Central Illinois Light Co., 205 Ill. App. 185 (1917).
41 Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 11. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E. 2d 231 (1956).
4 2 Alschuler v. Rockford Bolt & Steel Co., 318 Ill. App. 564, 48 N.E. 2d 435 (1943).
Manufacturer of scaffold hooks held not liable when scaffold collapsed. Contra, Car-
son v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342 11. App. 602, 97 N.E. 2d 620 (1951). Manufacturer of
elevator cable held liable when elevator fell.
43 Dittmar v. Ahern, 37 Ill. App. 2d 167, 185 N.E. 2d 264 (1962); Paul Harris Furni-
ture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E. 2d 275 (1956); Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas
Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946) (Applying Illinois law).
44 Biller v. Allis Chalniers Mfg. Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E. 2d 46 (1962).
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tation." 45 It was early held that a manufacturer who knowingly sends out
a product with a defect that renders it imminently dangerous is liable to
all persons whom he can reasonably foresee will use that product. Thus,
before Illinois recognized the imminently dangerous exception, the courts
allowed recovery against a negligent manufacturer for acts of omission on
the basis of fraud. In these cases knowledge of a defect was imputed to
the manufacturer.46 An example of this reasoning may be found in Em-
pire Machinery Co. v. Brady, 47 where a pulley belt from a negligently
made washing machine killed an employee of the purchaser. Here the
court imputed constructive knowledge of the defect to the manufacturer
because he failed to inspect the pulleys and belts attached to the machine
before placing it on the market. The sale of the washing machine by the
manufacturer with constructive knowledge of its defects constitutes
fraud. The courts have also applied the fraud principle to acts of com-
mission.4 This principle was illustrated in Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason
Co.,49 where the defendant was held liable for damage to plaintiff's open
hearth furnace caused by concealment of non-ferrous metals in a ship-
ment of scrap iron. However, a manufacturer can relieve himself of lia-
bility for his negligent act by a full disclosure of the defects to the pur-
chaser.50
THE FOOD CASES
One of the first areas in the field of manufacturers' liability in which
the courts applied liberal principles with consistency was in the food prod-
ucts cases. At first there was no warranty, even as to the retailer, and to
recover, the injured party had to prove negligence by the retailer. 51
Slightly before the turn of the century, in the leading case of Wiedeman
v. Keller,52 the broad principle was recognized that, "in all sales of meats
or provisions for immediate domestic use by a retail dealer there is an
implied warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for consumption." 8 This
warranty was later held to extend to the members of the purchaser's fam-
45 Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 I1. App. 2d 494, 503, 135 N.E. 2d 231, 236 (1956).
46 Standard Oil Co. v. Parrish, 145 Fed. 829 (7th Cir. 1906).
47 164 Ill. 58, 45 N.E. 486 (1896).
48 Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355 (1912). Manufacturer
who concealed defects in negligently made grinding wheel held liable for injuries to
employee of purchaser.
49 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946).
50 Trust Co. v. Lewis, 306 111. App. 132, 28 N.E. 2d 300 (1940).
51 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.E. 253 (1896).
52 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 I1. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
5 Id. at 98, 49 N.E. at 211.
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ily.5 4 The ultimate extension of liability occurred in Blarjeske v. Thomp-
son's Restaurant Co.65 where recovery was allowed to a plaintiff who was
neither a member of the family nor a household guest of the purchaser,
but rather a co-worker who shared a sandwich with the purchaser at their
place of employment.
Paralleling the liberal extension of liability from the retailer to the con-
sumer was a body of law which extended the liability of the food manu-
facturer to the consumer. Thus the injured party could look beyond the
immediate seller for relief. A vanguard case in this field is Salmon v.
Libby, McNeil & Libby.56 Here, in an action against an Illinois manufac-
turer under the Kansas wrongful death statute, the court required only a
showing that negligence was the proximate cause of the death; thus plain-
tiff, whose intestate was not in privity, stated a good cause of action.
Later, recovery was allowed against the manufacturer on the basis of
breach of implied warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for consump-
tion.57 Further liberalization of the rule permitted the purchaser "a rem-
edy either as against the person from whom the food was last purchased
or against any prior seller, or the producer of the article."58
A key factor in the liberalization process was the change in packaging
methods from unsealed to sealed containers. While the retailer was still
held liable, even though the goods were in a sealed container, 9 the manu-
facturer was also held liable on a warranty running with the goods.60 To
illustrate, in Poteraske v. Illinois Meat Co.,61 where food in a vacuum
sealed package contained glass, the court found a warranty running to the
consumer from the packer or distributor. But where food is not sold in a
sealed container, no warranty runs with the goods.62 However, whether
the goods are in a sealed container or in an unsealed container, the manu-
facturer may still be held liable on the basis of negligence. 53
5 Haut v. Kleene, 320 Il1. App. 273, 50 N.E. 2d 855 (1943).
55 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E. 2d 320 (1945).
56 114 M1. App. 258 (1904).
( 7Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfg., Inc., 322 III. App. 586, 54 N.E. 2d 759 (1944)
(recognizing rule as applying to pu~rchaser's family).
58 Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 111. App. 2d 28, 30, 116 N.E. 2d 193, 194
(1954) (emphasis added). Accord, Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 111. App.
2d 175, 132 N.E. 2d 442 (1956).
59 Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 III. App. 117 (1913).
eOPotargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 I. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947);
W~elter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 11. App. 305, 47 N.E. 2d 739 '(1943).
61342 111. App. 555, 97 N.E. 2d 475 (1951).
62 Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 I1M. App. 305, 47 N.E. 2d 739 (1943).
o3 Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfg., Inc., 322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N.E. 2d 759 (1944).
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The negligence relates, and the warranty applies as against the manu-
facturer, to the goods in the condition in which they left the factory.6 4 In
cases involving sealed containers, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies,65
provided the plaintiff can negative the existence of an intervening cause. 66
Thus the general rule on food products liability in Illinois has been
stated by the Appellate Court in the following words:
We are of the opinion that the duty of a manufacturer is to see to it that food
products put out by him are wholesome, and the implied warranty that such
products are fit for use runs with the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of
the consumer, rather than to the wholesaler or retailer, and that the question of




The violation of a statute in the manufacture of goods is not in and of
itself negligence, but only evidence of negligence. 68 For example, in Wel-
ter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 69 where the existence of white paint in a bottle
of milk was in violation of the Illinois Pure Food statute,70 plaintiff could
not recover because of failure to prove defendant's negligence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
THE ACCEPTANCE THEORY
At one time, the acceptance of an article by the vendee relieved the
vendor of liability to third persons. 71 Even today, by the operation of this
rule, the vendor of a patently defective article will, in the absence of spe-
64 Tiffin v. The Great A. & P. Tea Co., 18 Il. 2d 48, 162 N.E. 2d 406 (1959); Wil-
liams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 111. App. 1, 98 N.E. 2d 164 (1950).
65 Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfg., Inc., 322 111. App. 586, 54 N.E. 2d 759 (1944).
66 Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 35 111. App. 2d 406, 183 N.E. 2d 56 (1962);
Tiffin v. The Great A. & P. Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E. 2d 406 (1959); Williams v.
Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E. 2d 164 (1950); Bowman v.
Woodway Stores, 345 Ill. 110, 177 N.E. 727 (1931).
67 Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 111. App. 305, 321, 47 N.E. 2d 739, 746 (1943);
accord, Haut v. Kleene, 320 1ll. App. 273, 50 N.E. 2d 855 (1943) (extending warranty
of fimess and wholesomeness for consumption to preparation); but see Crandall v.
Stop & Shop, 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N.E. 2d 685 (1937) (warranty inapplicable to con-
tainer in which food is packaged).
68 Chapman v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 333 II. App. 529, 77 N.E. 2d 883 (1948). Dc-
fendant liable for storing combustibles in Illinois in violation of ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
1271 5 153 et. seq. (1961). Wintersteen v. Nat'l. Cooperage Co., 361 I. 95, 197 N.E.
578 (1935) (shipping of empty barrels in violation of Interstate Commerce Act).
69 318 Ill. App. 305,47 N.E. 2d 739 (1943).
70 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 561, S 16 (1961).
71 Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902); Field v. French, 80 Ill.
App. 78 (1899).
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cial circumstances, be relieved of liability by the vendee's acceptance. 72
However, if the article has a latent defect, and if it is a defect that is likely
to result in injury, the vendor is liable to injured third persons, regardless
of acceptance. 7
3
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT
The bulk of Illinois litigation in the field of manufacturers' liability has
taken place since the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in 1915.74 The
sections of the Act relevant to the field of manufacturers' liability ap-
peared to be in conformity with case law prior to their adoption; and
subsequent case law embodies the provisions of the Act. Section 12 states
that:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise75 by the seller76 relating to the goods
is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation br promise is
to induce the buyer to purchase the goodk77 and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying thereon.7 8
In addition to Section 12, Section 15, dealing with implied warranties of
quality, is often pertinent to cases involving manufacturers' liability. Ev-
ery contract, unless otherwise agreed, is held to embody not only trade
72 Kordig v. Grovedale Oleander Homes, Inc., 18 IMI. App. 2d 48, 151 N.E. 2d 470
(1958).
73 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co. Inc., 20 II. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E. 2d
(1959); Dixon v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 351 Il. App. 75, 114 N.E. 2d 44 (1953);
Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 2d 162 (1928) (stating rule).
74 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211 (1961).
75 Hawkins v. Berry, 10 Ill. 36 (5 Gilm.) (1848).
76 Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n., 30 ll1. App. 2d 283, 174 N.E. 2d 697
(1962). Defendant was not liable when manufacturer used its tag to certify quality of
seed. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ill. 1935). Manufacturer's
advertising statements are not by a "seller"; therefore, injured party could not recover
from the manufacturer with whom he was not in privity.
7 7 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth, 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E. 2d 427 (1941) (statement after
sale not an inducement); Air Conditioning Corp. v. Honaker, 296 Ill. App. 221, 16 NE.
2d 153 (1938). The term "air conditioning" was vague; therefore, parol was admissible
to define it. Dallum v. Birdsall, 66 Il. 378 (1872) (third party beneficiary of seller's
express warranty recovered from seller in absence of privity).
78 Bender v. Cooper & Nephews Inc.. 323 I1. App. 96, 55 N.E. 2d 94 (1944) (label
must be read as a whole to constitute a warranty); Gaw v. Lake Erie Chemical Co.,
293 Il. App. 123, 11 N.E. 2d 982 (1937). Since plaintiff did not read the pamphlet, he
could not rely on the warranties it contained. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 Ill.
App. 340 (1928). Warranties do not apply when the product is used in an extraordinary
manner. Present Illinois law requires that the instructions on the label be followed in
order for the injured party to recover. See Dittmar v. Ahem, 37 111. App. 167, 185 N.E.
2d 264 (1962); but see, Malstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co. 271 Ill. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915).
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custom and usage, but also the implied warranties of the Sales Act.79 The
most important of these, as concerning theliability of manufacturers, are
the implied warranties of quality of Section 15, subsections (1) and (2),
which state:
(1) Where a buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality.
It was early held that a manufacturer impliedly warrants an article to
be fit for its particular purpose,80 as stated in subsection 1 of Section 15,
and that vendors generally warrant that the goods are of fair, average
quality,8' i.e. merchantable. However, the Sales Act recognizes in sub-
section (3), where the buyer has examined the goods and reasonably
should have discovered the defect, that the warranties of merchantibility
and fitness for a particular purpose are negatived as to him. And in sub-
section (4), where the article is purchased under its patent or other trade
name, there is no implied warranty of fitness for purpose although there
still is an implied warranty of merchantibility.
s2
Subsection (5) of the Sales Act codifies the principle that warranties "as
to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage
of trade. '8 However, if there is any agreement of the parties inconsistent
with the implied warranties, the warranties will be negatived, as provided
in subsection (6).84
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act have, for the most
part, been adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code,8 5 with modifica-
79 Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Goal & Coke Co., 334 Ill. 287, 165 N.E.
793 (1929).
80 Hallock v. Cutler, 71111. App. 471 (1897); Archdale v. Moore, 19 Ill. 565 (1858).
81 Beers v. Williams, 16 111. 69 (1854); Misner v. Granger, 9 111. 69 (4 Gilm.) (1847).
82 But see Appleman v. Fabert Motors Inc., 30 111. App. 2d 424, 174 N.E. 2d 892
(1961). Purchase of automobile by trade name will not negative implied warranties of
quality. Contra, Fuchs & Lang Mfg. Co. v. Kittredge & Co., 146 Ill. App. 350 (1909);
Peoria Grape Sugar Co. v. Turney, 175 Ill. 631, 51 N.E. 587 (1898).
83 Miszczak v. Maytag Chicago Co., 11 Ill. App. 2d 496, 138 N.E. 2d 52 (1956).
Since washing machine was used for two years by another without trouble, plaintiff
could not make out a case of negligence sufficient in law.
84 See Haas v. Buick Motor Division, 20 111. App. 2d 448, 156 N.E. 2d 263 (1959).
85 h.. REv. STA-r. ch. 26, § 2-314 to § 2-317 (1961).
COMMENTS
tions only to bring the statutory law into conformity with the developing
case law on the subject. The subject matter of Section 2-318, while not
treated in the Sales Act, is a statutory recognition of the Illinois case law
on the subject. 6 The pertinent portion of this section is as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
The comments following this section specifically indicate that it is neu-
tral as regards extension or restriction of "the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to
other persons in the distributive chain."87
CONCLUSION
In the early history of manufacturer's liability, where the manufacturer
sold directly to the consumer, the Illinois courts developed a principle of
law that the maker impliedly warranted the quality and workmanship of
his product. Later, when merchandising methods became more complex
through the growth of the wholesaling and retailing functions, the pro-
ducer became isolated from the ultimate purchaser. Because of this remote
relationship, the doctrine of privity in negligence actions against the man-
ufacturer by the purchasing public evolved. It was soon recognized, how-
ever, that in many instances public policy demanded that the manufac-
turer should be answerable for his negligence even though he was not in
privity of contract with the injured party. Thus, the "inherent" "immi-
nent," and food products exceptions to the "general rule" developed. The
legislature stepped into the field by enacting statutes which placed a duty
of care on the manufacturer in such fields as: storage of petroleum, sale
of combustibles and sale of foods and drugs. The violation of these stat-
utes was merely evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.
Although the privity requirement is slowly being eroded away by a
plethora of exceptions, the Illinois courts are still tenaciously clinging to
it by an almost adamant refusal to allow recovery where the fact situa-
86 Cf., Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 IH. App. 189, 59 N.E. 2d 320
(1945) (seller's warranty extended to person who was not in the family or household
of the buyer, nor a guest in the buyer's home). "To say that, in the case at bar there
was an implied warranty to [the person] who purchased the rabbits for food but that
it did not extend to his wife and children, in our opinion does not make sense." Haut
v. Kleene, 320 I1. App. 273, 280, 50 N.E. 2d 855, 857 (1943). And in Standard Oil Co.
v. Parrish, 145 Fed. 829 (7th Cir. 1906), the court found for plaintiff on the ground
that, "defendant was supplying oil for illumination and must have contemplated that
it would be burned in the ordinary and usual lamps in the households of the pur-
chasers."
87 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-318, comment 3 (1958).
